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Matter 20

Summary

Security Breach Report

Account by:	Kirill Kulish, 38. Security guard.
Source:	Security breach form.
Location:	Kyiv, Ukraine.
Event:	24 Aug 1991.
Report:	26 Aug 1991.
Catalogued:	14 Sep 2015.

Report

Name of individual completing this form:	Kirill Ivanovych Kulish
Date of creation:	26.08.91

Site Information	
Site Address	CBV Warehouse, Yams'ka Vulytsya, Kyiv
Security Manager	Josyp Vsevolodovych Palamarchuk
Products/Services	Warehouse

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Number of Employees	12 (3 shifts of 3, 3 on call)
Operating Hours	Always in operation

Description of Security Breach	
Time and date of discovery	24.08.91
Period during which breach occurred	Between 22:00 23.08.91 and 6:00 24.08.91
Indicators of malicious intent	Wire cut north fence
	Window forced open north wall
	Cabinet J 191 forced open
Isolated or repeated event	Isolated
Brief overview of breach	Perpetrator entered through window, making no noise One item stolen Perpetrator left by same means

Affected Resources	
Individuals affected	2 senior guards 4 guards
Information affected	None

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Assets affected	Corded ware bowl taken
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Containment	
Emergency response contingency plan	Enacted when forced entry was discovered at change of shift
Crisis communication management	All guards were in constant communication by walkie-talkie
Steps taken to contain breach	Immediate lockdown Thorough search of premises Police immediately informed
Spokesman to deal with enquiries	To be decided

Harm	
Possible harms arising from breach	Comparatively minor financial loss, estimated 1,000 roubles

Latest Risk Assessment	
Date of latest risk assessment	18.07.1988
Physical security risks identified	Perimeter fence rusting Camera blind spot southeast

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	Broken bolt on flat roof access door
Access control risks identified	Boom gate needs replacing Up-to-date visitor badges required
Management policy risks identified	Insufficient investment in maintenance
Information risks identified	Filing cabinet keys lost
Personnel risks identified	None
Location risks identified	Northeast corner open to vehicle assault

Threat Identification	
Key vulnerable resources identified	Gold and silver coins Jewellery Ikons
Credible threats identified	Criminal gangs Enemies of the Soviet Union
Have the police reviewed the threats?	Yes

Policies in place to address:

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Fire, explosions, bomb threats	Activate manual sprinkler system Summon fire brigade Remove important documents Evacuate building, assemble at main entrance Secure perimeter, await fire brigade
Civil disturbance	Secure all doors and windows of facility Alert police If perimeter breached, staff still outside are to find a place of safety
Suspicious mail	All mail is returned unopened
Visitor registration and ID badges	Visitors are checked against the list of expected visitors Visitors must show identification Visitors are provided with a badge Anyone seen not wearing a badge is to be challenged

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Background checks on visitors	These are performed by police Visitors not cleared in advance are not permitted entry
Escalating security threats	The on-call team is contacted, to report within 30 minutes
Hiring of security staff	Police background check Physical health check Psychological health check Weapons training check
Lost or stolen keys	All locks that the missing keys can open are replaced within 24 hours

Barriers	
Physical barriers in place	Wire mesh fences Trees to prohibit vehicle attack Security hinges on doors and windows Blast-resistant glass in windows
Unmanned access points	Normally the access point is manned

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	In an emergency, chain and padlock
Perimeter lighting	Good in east, excellent in west
Alarms	Fire alarm tested monthly Burglar alarm tested 6-monthly
Surveillance camera monitoring	Live, archived to tape
Frequency of perimeter patrols	Every 4 hours and at random intervals in between
Warning signs posted	"Restricted Area" on each fence
Redundant protection for key assets	Coins and jewellery in the safe Ikons in bulletproof, fireproof cabinet Security staff have no keys to the above

Complete Description of Breach

My name is Kirill Ivanovych Kulish. I lead Green Unit, which is one of the three units assigned to protect the CBV warehouse on Yams'ka Vulytsya. The warehouse is under the direct jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It contains rare objects and valuable items obtained in the

aftermath of the Great Patriotic War that are being held until their owners can be found.

Yams'ka Vulytsya is an area of light industry and warehouses close to a railway siding. It is run-down yet, because of this, is relatively free of criminal activity. No break-ins have previously been attempted in the 45 years of the CBV warehouse's existence.

Two-weekly shift rotation is in operation for the site. On the day in question, Green Unit took over from Blue Unit at 6:00 and handed off to Red Unit at 14:00.

I assembled with the other two members of Green Unit, comrade Denys Omelyanovych Fesenko and comrade Petro Savych Tymchenko, at 6:00. We were greeted as usual by the leader of Blue Unit, comrade Borys Antonovych Kyrylenko. As per handover policy, a patrol of the premises was undertaken jointly by members of both units. It was during this patrol that evidence of the break-in was discovered.

At once, comrade Kyrylenko and I initiated lockdown procedures, in case the perpetrators were still on site. The police were immediately informed by telephone. A thorough search was conducted, with all members of both teams in constant communication by walkie-talkie. No perpetrator was found.

Two police officers arrived at 8:20 in response to our call. By then we had established

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(and the two officers were able to confirm) the following:

1. Entry through the perimeter fence had been effected by cutting a man-sized door in the wire mesh. This was not visible at a distance, because the wire is thick and wished to keep its shape. It must have been held open by one person while another entered. At least two people were therefore involved in the break-in.
2. There were no footprints or other marks left in the dirt between the hole in the fence and the building. It is assumed that the perpetrators traversed the distance from the fence to the warehouse wall by laying planks or tarpaulin.
3. The frame of the westernmost window of the north wall bore signs of having been attacked by acid or some other corrosive substance. This left the frame sufficiently intact that the alarm circuit was not broken, but it enabled the silent removal of the glass and its later makeshift replacement upon the perpetrators' exit.
4. The window gave access to the locker room where unit members keep their personal belongings. An unlocked door opens up onto the warehouse space. The perpetrators made their way to crate J 191, which is situated two thirds of the way down looking from the north, close to

the western wall. It is clear that the perpetrators knew exactly where it was and knew exactly what they wanted to take from it. This was a targeted operation.

The police officers stated that they would record the incident and check it against similar incidents in their files. They added that because the building was under the direct jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it was not the responsibility of the police to investigate further.

I asked comrade Kyrylenko a number of questions regarding the break-in.

Why was the gap in the wire and the damage to the window not noticed by patrols?

– No patrols were undertaken between 22:00 and 6:00.

Why was the perimeter break-in and the traversal of the space between the perimeter and the building not observed by the officer monitoring the security cameras?

– No officer was monitoring the security cameras.

Why wasn't entry to the warehouse space from the locker room detected?

– No-one was in either the warehouse space or the locker room.

Why wasn't the opening of crate J 191 heard?

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– No-one was in the warehouse space.

From the above, it appears that Blue Unit was negligent. I doubt that this will worry the members of Blue Unit in the slightest.

I am filling in this form because to do so is a requirement following a break-in. However, it is not a requirement of me to do so: it is a requirement of the security manager.

The security manager of the CBV warehouse is Josyp Vsevolodovych Palamarchuk. He knows nothing about security. His position is a sinecure. He visits the premises every two weeks for the shift rotation, if he can be bothered. He wouldn't know what to put in this form if he had a month to find out. The only reason I am filling in the form in his stead is because of the tiny chance that if I didn't I may find myself and the other members of Green Unit framed if the break-in is ever investigated.

I nevertheless do not expect the break-in to be investigated.

The CBV warehouse is supposed to be under the direct jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It is not. If it were, it would be guarded by members of the army and would be in a more appropriate location than a nondescript warehouse adjacent to a forgotten railway siding.

It would also have proper funding. Although losing a dozen employees in a list of twelve thousand may be easy, it is not so easy to lose roubles. Roubles are tracked and accounted for with great precision. This is why the CBV warehouse has no money for maintenance. The keys for the filing cabinet have been missing for five years yet the locks have still not been replaced.

Nobody knows what the letters CBV stand for. When I joined Green Unit, the man I replaced told me he'd been working at the warehouse since it was opened. He didn't know what the initials stood for. He believed that they were chosen at random for no better reason than the warehouse needed a name.

None who work in this warehouse are stupid. We all know that the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic does not control it. Members or former members do. The valuable items are not awaiting return to their rightful owners. They are stolen. They have been stowed away for the use of the families of the privileged in times of crisis.

On the night of 23rd– 24th of August, an Act of Declaration of independence was written. It was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Everyone knew this was happening. Everyone hoped it would be passed. Everyone – including the members of Blue Unit – was listening to the radio or

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watching the television as events unfolded. Only the people who had been waiting for this moment to break into the warehouse and steal the one object they wanted did not.

The items in the warehouse will undoubtedly be collected in the next few days as large numbers of their original owners are miraculously discovered. None of us who work here expects to keep our job for much longer. The gold and silver coins, the jewellery and the ikons will be removed from the safe. Anything that remains will come under the jurisdiction of a new government. It may even find a museum to put them in.

I am confident that the most precious item has already been removed. Whatever the corded ware bowl kept in crate J 191 truly is, its thieves are welcome to it.

Signature:

К. И. Кулисах

Notes

Translated from the Russian by Julija Mikhailova-Ross and Lara Petrova.